Abstract: This paper presents a hardware Trojan classification method that performs a static analysis in gate-level netlist. Based on the controllability and observability characteristics extracted in a circuit, the nets are clustered into two groups with the k-means method. Then inter-cluster distance is measured and taken as the major feature for Trojan identification. By combined with three other features in terms of circuit scale statistic number, a complementary representation of Trojan circuits is constructed. Finally, a support vector machine classifier is trained to distinguish the Trojan circuits from genuine circuits. Experimental results on Trust-HUB benchmarks demonstrate that our method can achieve up to 100% true positive rate.
Introduction
With the globalization of integrated circuits (ICs) fabrication process and design, IC trustworthiness has become a major concern. Since the majority of intellectual property (IP) cores are provided by the third-party vendors, hardware Trojans (HTs) may be inserted or embedded into IP cores by some suppliers with ulterior motives. HTs can transform IC functionality, reveal valuable information, reduce reliability, and even incapacitate a chip [1] . Once the IP cores containing the HTs are applied to the system design, it will lead to severe security issues and even huge economic losses. Therefore, hardware Trojans detection technology has drawn more and more attention.
Hardware Trojans detection technology can be roughly classified into two major groups: post-silicon detection and pre-silicon detection. Post-silicon detection mainly includes side channel analysis, reverse engineering and functional testing. Among them, side channel analysis [2] is widely applied which compares IC characteristics such as delay time, power consumption, and temperature with a golden chip that does not contain any HTs, unfortunately, a golden chip is usually hard to get in practice. On the other hand, pre-silicon design methods often detect HTs on gated level netlists, which can be categorized into two types: the dynamic and static detection. Dynamic detection techniques [3, 4, 5, 6] generally judge a circuit according to the activation of HT parts. However, HTs are often latent and rarely activated under ordinary functional verification constrains thus hard to discover. By contrast, static detection techniques do not require any test pattern generation and, hence, the consequences of detection get rid of the effects of simulation consequences. Static detection techniques can detect various HTs with different functions even new-style ones by utilizing existing HTs related characteristics.
Recently lots of static hardware Trojan detection methods have been proposed. In [7] , the controllability and observability analysis has been proved to be an effective technique for Trojan detection and makes it possible to fully restore an inserted Trojan. And a SVM-based method by learning based on five hardware Trojan features in each net in a netlist is proposed [8] , which increases the true positive rate in most of cases. Yet, these methods are sensitive to some genuine signals with low switching activity or particular Trojan nets which are activated frequently like normal nets, and therefore the accuracy and robustness of Trojan identification are considerably low. [9] proposes an HT rank method which is a new quantitative analysis criterion against HTs at gate-level netlists and can distinguish HT-inserted netlists from HT-free ones in all the gate-level netlists of Trust-HUB. But, it takes much processing time in large netlists.
This paper proposes a more stable SVM-based hardware Trojan classification method in gate-level netlists which does not need any golden circuit as a reference or any test pattern application for Trojan activation. The main contributions include: 1) four significant hardware Trojan features in netlists are proposed to represent a circuit which is Trojan inserted or not; 2) with a complementary representation of Trojan circuits, a machine learning based scheme of hardware Trojan classification is developed; 3) Experiments conducted on Trust-HUB benchmarks shows that the proposed method successfully classifies all the gate-level netlists into HT-inserted ones and HT-free ones. 4) The method also identifies a small amount of suspicious Trojan nets in HT-inserted netlists which helps to locate the HTs quickly and exactly.
2 Proposed method Fig. 1 presents the flowchart of the proposed method. Firstly, it takes benchmarks of gate-level netlists as the inputs, and performs the controllability and observability analysis to determine controllability and observability values. Secondly, based on obtained controllability and observability values, the k-means clustering is executed to cluster all the nets into two groups. Afterwards, the inter-cluster distance of them is calculated and combined with three scale statistic numbers of the circuit as a four-dimensional vector to train a SVM classifier. Finally, an unknown netlist can be successfully classified as the HT-inserted or the normal by using the learned SVM classifier.
Controllability and observability analysis
In order to reduce the detectability, hardware Trojans designers will try to improve the stealth characteristics and distribution of Trojan insertion. To hide the activity of Hardware Trojans, the trigger might be connected to nets with low activity to create a rare triggering vector, and the payload might connect nets whose deviations are not easily observable.
Testability is a relative measure of the cost of testing a logic circuit. It reflects the effort required to perform the main test operations of controlling internal signals from primary inputs (PIs) and observing internal signals at primary outputs (POs) [10] . A design of good testability should be easy to set the signals in the ideal state, isolate the faults and observe the state. Quite the opposite, Trojan module is always stealthy, which means the precondition for activation is a very rare event, and more infrequently determines circuit primary outputs and its states. Trojan signals should have considerably low testability to remain hidden during circuit authentication.
The Sandia Controllability/Observability Analysis Program (SCOAP) is widely used for testability analysis that calculates the controllability and observability of each signal s in a circuit. In the SCOAP, several combinational testability measures are defined including: CC0(s) -combinational 0-controllability of s, CC1(s) -combinational 1-controllability of s and CO(s) -observability of s, which are related to the number of signals that must be manipulated in order to control or observe s from at PIs or at POs. The numerical values of CC0 and CC1 range between 1 and infinity, while the values of CO range between 0 and infinity. For initialization, the controllability values of a primary input are set to 1, and the observability value of a primary output is set to 0. The first step in SCOAP is to calculate the controllability measures of all signals. The circuit is levelized from PIs to POs in order to assign a level order for each gate. Then the output controllability of each gate is calculated in lever order after the controllability measures of all its inputs have been calculated. Once controllability measures are calculated for all signals, the observability of each signal can be calculated. The rules for each type of gates are summarized in [10] . For example, a multi-input XOR gate whose output can be controlled by multiple input sets, then:
where O ctrl represents the controllability value of output, I c are the controllability values of input sets. A larger CC0(s) or CC1(s) value implies that it is more difficult to control signal s to 0 or 1 from primary input and similarly, a larger CO(s) value indicates that it is more difficult to observe s at any primary output. Fig. 2 shows the average SCOAP values of Trojan nets and normal nets in EthennetMAC10GE-T710, one of the HT-inserted netlists from Trust-HUB. Compared to other normal nets, the Trojan nets have very large CC0, CC1 and CO. It signifies that realizing a stealthy Trojan which required to be activated rarely would result in significant high controllability and observability values of Trojan nets. A corollary is that those nets having large controllability and observability values are very likely to be Trojan nets. Therefore, it is expected that Trojan nets and normal nets can be effectively classified by using SCOAP data.
Testability feature extraction
k-means clustering is one of the most common clustering algorithms which is desired to maximize inter-cluster distances and to minimize intra-cluster distances [8] . Given a set of observations ðx 1 ; x 2 ; Á Á Á ; x n Þ, where each observation is a ddimensional real vector, k-means aims to partition the n observations into k sets S ¼ fS 1 ; S 2 ; Á Á Á ; S k g so as to minimize the within-cluster sum of squares. Formally, the objective is to find:
where i is the mean of points in S i .
After feeding the controllability and observability values, i.e. CC0, CC1 and CO, in the form of a 3-dimensional dataset to the k-means algorithm where k ¼ 2, two net lists are produced: normal nets list and Trojan nets list. If the distance between the two clusters is considerable, one of them falls in the Trojans list and the circuit is Trojan inserted. And vice versa they both fall in the normal lists, that is, there is no Trojans net and the circuit is HT-free. Consequently, the inter-cluster distance can be measured and used as one Trojan feature of the circuit.
Multiple features consolidation
Considering the circuits have different sizes, and they contain Trojans with different sizes and functionality, it is supposed that the inter-cluster distance has something correlation with the scale of the circuit. Thus, to enhance the ability to represent the Trojan circuits, the numbers of primitives, AND gates, and OR gates in the circuits are calculated as the three other features. Here, the primitives include all the information of inputs/outputs, DFFs, BUFs, MUXs and other gates. As the feature of inter-cluster distance is considered more important than the others, so the weights for each of them are set with different values. After weighting and normalization, a four-dimensional feature vector F is constructed for each netlist sample:
where N P , N A , and N O respectively represent the number of primitives, AND gates, and OR gates, and D represents the inter-cluster distance between the two clusters. w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , and w 4 are the weights of N P , N A , and N O and inter-cluster distance. In this paper, they are set to 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, and 0.5 empirically.
SVM-based classifier training and hardware Trojan classification
Recently, lots of machine learning methods are proposed to solve classification problems, including linear regression, k nearest neighbor, SVM, neural networks, etc. Among them, SVM is outstanding since it is capable of achieving accurate predicting accuracy while maintaining moderate training time consuming [11] . Thus, in this paper, a SVM classifier is adopted to separate HT-inserted netlists and normal netlists.
In our proposed method, SVM consists of two parts: training and classification which is illustrated in Fig. 3 . In the training stage, the SVM parameters C and γ are optimized by maximizing the true positive rate (TPR). That is, the maximum TPR is the training target of the parameter optimization. TPR is defined by
where TP is the number of HT-inserted netlists identified to be HT-inserted. FN is the number of HT-inserted netlists identified to be normal netlists mistakenly. In the classification stage, the unknown netlists can be identified to be HT-inserted or not by using the learned SVM classifier.
3 Experimental results and discussions
Experimental results
Experiments are conducted on Trust-Hub benchmark suites [12] to evaluate the performance of the proposed method. Since Trust-HUB does not provide HT-free RSR232 netlists, we make them by manually removing hardware Trojans from HT- inserted RS232 netlists. Moreover, oversampling is implemented to balance the numbers of positive and negative samples thus all the HT-inserted netlist in TrustHub are companied with their corresponding HT-free netlists. We obtain CC0, CC1, and CO values for each net in every circuit by using Synopsys TetraMAX. Then we execute unsupervised k-means clustering, multiple features consolidation, and SVM-based classifier training. Subsequently the learned classifier can identify an unknown netlist whether it contains Trojans or not.
In Synopsys TetraMAX, when the "pin data setting" of SCOAP is selected, the displayed data is the SCOAP rating value which consists of three characters of the form "CC0-CC1-CO". Any Trojan circuit not connected to the main circuit would have infinite CC or CO values and an asterisk "*" in the report. "*" indicates the value exceeds 254, the limit that the program can track. As an example, Table I presents the average values of SCOAP data of gate-level netlists from Trust-HUB benchmark. Obviously, in most HT-inserted netlists, the SCOAP values of Trojan nets are much larger than normal nets'. Fig. 4 depicts the results of unsupervised k-means clustering with k ¼ 2 for two selected gate-level netlists, where the ordinate represents observability value and the abscissa represents the Euclidean norm of controllability value. (a) shows for HT-inserted netlists, normal nets are localized in the bottom left corner of graph while Trojan nets are mainly located in the right of graph, and in (b), there is no clear line of demarcation between the two clusters for HT-free netlist. The intercluster distance in HT-inserted netlist is definitely larger than that in normal netlist such that it can be a significant hint to classify between Trojan netlist and normal netlist.
In experiments, the five-fold cross-validation scheme is adopted to show how well the proposed method performs. When a dataset is used for training, it is randomly divided into five subsets with equivalent size, four of them are employed for training and the rest one is used for testing. Usually it will be repeated several times and final evaluation result is the average value of all the test results because of the random division procedure.
The features of each netlists and the results of SVM classification are shown in Table II . The proposed method can successfully distinguish all the benchmarks into HT-inserted ones and HT-free ones. It is worth mentioning that when we say a benchmark is correctly identified that means there is no fail case under 1,000 times cross-validation. Then true positive rate (TPR) is calculated as discussed in Section 2.4. In the same way, the true negative rate (TNR) can be defined by the number of HT-free netlists correctly classified into HT-free over the number of total HT-free netlists.
Experimental results indicate our proposed method realizes 100% TPR and 100% TNR for those netlists shown in Table II and when given an unknown circuit in gate-level netlist, our SVM-based hardware Trojan classification method can successfully identify it by just using learning data.
As shown in Fig. 5(a) , RS232-T1000 benchmark contains a Trojan whose trigger is a combinational comparator and its trigger input probability is 3.55e-13. Whenever Trojan gets triggered, its payload gains control over one primary output signal and two internal signals. Fig. 5(b) shows CC0, CC1, and CO for Trojan signals. The results show either controllability value or observability value of Trojan signals has the maximum value. So, the Trojans can be easily detected. Overall, we can say from the experiments that in a netlist the nets which have large testability values are much more likely to be Trojan nets. The performance that our method can effectively detect Trojan-like nets is so valuable to help locate an inserted Trojan in a circuit.
Discussions
As mentioned above, dynamic detection techniques require function simulation.
The TPR values in [4, 5, 6] are much dependent on the functional simulation as well as input test patterns. As the scale of IC increases, activating all kinds of hardware Trojans is impossible. In addition, dynamic detection techniques are noneffective while Trojan is the type of always-on. For the reason that our method is static, it is not subject to the restrictions of HTs activation characteristics. The method in [3] is one of the strongest hardware Trojan identifying methods at gate-level netlists proposed so far. It extracts Trojan features introduced at Trust-HUB and defines an incremental metric to isolate some of Trojan nets from the rest of circuit. The proposed method does not require a golden circuit. Nevertheless, it takes considerable processing time even for such small circuits. The method in [8] trying to identify whether each net in an unknown netlist is Trojan or not only can achieves 100% true positive in quite a few cases and the true negative rate is relatively small upon most occasions. Moreover, it does not tell how to correctly decide the label of an unknown netlist. Different from the focus of them, our method aims to tell an unknown circuit whether it is HT-inserted. This is primary task for IC security analysis. COTD [7] produces two signal lists: Trojan signal list and genuine signal list. Only if the Trojan signal list is empty, the circuit is labeled HT-free; otherwise, the circuit is HT-inserted. Yet, two gate-level Trojans of 23 test samples failed to be detected in experiment. When circuit contains some genuine signals with low switching activity which can be mistakenly identified as Trojan signals, the result will go wrong.
Different from the previous methods, our proposed method using the SVMbased classifier is capable to identify an unknown circuit whether it is HT-inserted or not. Even if some mistakes occur that genuine signals with low switching activity existing in circuit are clustered into wrong group, the next steps in the flow can rectify them. The results on Trust-HUB benchmarks under 1000 times of crossvalidation exhibit high accuracy and robustness across different benchmarks compared to the existing state-of-the-art methods.
HT rank [9] is the world-first quantitative analysis criterion against HTs at gatelevel netlists which does not use any simulation tools but just calculate Trojan points based on Trojan net features. By ranking all the gate-level netlists in Trust-HUB and other benchmark suites, it can completely distinguish HT-inserted ones from HT-free ones. We compare our method and HT Rank from the viewpoint of detection ratio and processing time. The detection ratio here refers to TPR and TNR as described above. HT Rank and our proposed method can both realize 100% TPR and 100% TNR for Trust-HUB. However, when given large HT-inserted netlists, HT Rank is slower than our proposed method. This is because [9] does not construct data structure for a netlist in implementation. Whenever HT Rank operates a netlist, it has to read the overall gate-level file and then the calculation in HT rank occupies 90% or more in the processing time. In [9] the HT rank method is implemented on Xeon E7-4870, and we use Xeon E5606 which performs slightly worse than the former. For our proposed method, time to prepare data and extract features has taken less than 13 seconds in the worst case. When SVM model is constructed, it just takes 0.05 second to determine whether a circuit contains a Trojan. And yet, the HT rank method takes approximately several minutes to one day depending on a netlist to calculate an HT rank which is derived from its own paper. Table III summarizes comparison of COTD, UCI, VeriTrust, FANCI, HT Rank and our proposed method when applying to all the "HT-inserted" Trust-HUB gatelevel netlists. The checkmark in the table indicates that HT is successfully detected. The results of these methods are derived from their own papers above. As shown in the table, both of HT Rank and our proposed method successfully detect all the HTs while other methods fail in several cases.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a more sophisticated Trojan classification flow based on controllability and observability analysis, which does not require any test pattern generation and application. The high accuracy and robustness of hardware Trojan detection in experiments validate that our proposed method is a promising solution to detect Trojans in gate-level and can be easily integrated into current commercial integrated design flow.
